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Surpassing the repeaterless bound is a crucial task on the way towards realizing long-distance
quantum key distribution. In this paper, we focus on the protocol proposed by Azuma et al. in
[Nature Communications 6, 10171 (2015)], which can beat this bound with idealized devices. We
investigate the robustness of this protocol against imperfections in realistic setups, particularly the
multiple-photon pair components emitted by practical entanglement sources. In doing so, we derive
necessary conditions on the photon-number statistics of the sources in order to beat the repeaterless
bound. We show, for instance, that parametric down-conversion sources do not satisfy the required
conditions and thus cannot be used to outperform this bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can
provide two distant parties (Alice and Bob) with
information-theoretically secure secret keys [1–3]. How-
ever, in point-to-point QKD via pure-loss bosonic chan-
nels, the achievable secret key rate is fundamentally lim-
ited by the so-called repeaterless bound [4–6]. In the limit
of high channel loss (i.e., long distances) the repeaterless
bound is proportional to the transmittance of the chan-
nel connecting Alice and Bob, denoted by η. This means
that the secret key rate of any point-to-point QKD pro-
tocol scales at most with η. As in the case of optical
fibers η = e−L/Latt , where L is the distance between the
parties and Latt is the attenuation length of the fiber,
this poses a stringent limitation on the achievable secret
key rate. Therefore, surpassing the repeaterless bound is
an essential step towards efficient long-distance quantum
communication.
A simple idea to outperform the repeaterless bound
is to introduce intermediate nodes, dividing the channel
into many smaller segments so that the probability of los-
ing a signal stays relatively small on each segment. This
naturally leads to the concept of quantum repeaters [7–
15], which are typically based on entanglement swapping
and distillation. However, to truly benefit from a quan-
tum repeater, one needs many nodes and demanding
technological resources, which makes the experimental
realization very challenging with current technology [16].
Another, recently proposed idea is twin-field QKD
(TF-QKD) [17], which is based on single-photon inter-
ference and includes one intermediate node performing
such conceptually simple interferometric measurement.
Indeed, this offers a square root improvement in the scal-
ing of the secret key rate. This proposal has triggered
a lot of attention in the field and various simple secu-
rity proofs and improved versions of the original proto-
col have been very recently introduced [18–24]. Proof-of-
principle experiments to show the feasibility of some of
the suggested TF-type QKD protocols have already been
demonstrated experimentally [25–28], which may suggest
the viability of this approach to achieve intercity QKD
with current technology.
The same square root improved scaling can be
achieved if one extends the original measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [29] protocol, based on
two-photon interference, with some feedback mechanism
to make sure that the Bell state measurement (BSM)
is performed between signals that actually survived the
channel loss. One way is to make use of quantum memo-
ries [30–32], but the required memory parameters are still
challenging for current technology [33]. To avoid the need
for quantum memories while having the same square root
improved scaling, Azuma et al. proposed the idea of a
fully optical, adaptive MDI-QKD [34] (AMDI-QKD) pro-
tocol, using standard optical teleportation for performing
a quantum non-demolition measurement (QND) [35] to
confirm the arrival of the single-photon signals at the
middle node. While the required technology to imple-
ment the AMDI-QKD protocol is far off our current ex-
perimental capabilities, this protocol could offer higher
secret key rates than the TF-QKD protocol, because the
former is based on two-photon interference at the middle
node while the latter is based on single-photon interfer-
ence [36].
The original AMDI-QKD scheme [34] assumes highly
idealized devices, like, for instance, perfect entanglement
sources, which are capable of generating a perfect EPR
pair on demand for the teleportation in the QND mea-
surement, and perfect single-photon sources. In this pa-
per, we investigate the robustness of this protocol against
source imperfections, like for example a non-vanishing
probability of emitting multiple-photon signals and thus
introducing extra noise into the system. By performing
a full-mode analysis of a realistic setup we derive a nec-
essary condition on the photon-number statistics of the
sources for overcoming the repeaterless bound in [5].
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2In doing so, we also show, for example, that with para-
metric down-conversion (PDC) sources, the AMDI-QKD
protocol has a scaling of at most η, therefore unable to
beat the repeaterless bound. This is due to the fact
that PDC sources have a too large probability of emit-
ting multiple-photon pairs compared to the probability
of emitting single-photon pairs.
We note that a similar behavior has also been observed
in the context of the ensemble-based quantum mem-
ory assisted MDI-QKD [37] protocol. Ensemble-based
quantum memories have many favorable properties, but
they inherently suffer from a non-negligible probability
of emitting multiple-photons (similar to that of the PDC
sources) causing the advantageous scaling offered by a
traditional memory assisted system [30–32] to vanish.
In this regard, we remark that our result is stronger
than that introduced in [37] in the sense that it ap-
plies even with photon-number resolving (PNR) detec-
tors, while [37] assumes threshold detectors.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II, the in-
vestigated protocol is introduced and its secret key rate
formula is presented. Sec. III describes mathematically
the physical devices used for the implementation of the
protocol. Next, in Sec. IV we present the main results
of the paper. Here, we obtain necessary conditions on
the applied entanglement sources for overcoming the re-
peaterless bound [5] with the AMDI-QKD protocol. As
a corollary, we prove that the protocol is not capable of
beating the repeaterless bound [5] using PDC sources.
Lastly, Sec. V contains the conclusions of the paper. The
paper also includes two appendices for providing the de-
tails of the calculations.
II. THE AMDI-QKD PROTOCOL
A. Protocol steps
The schematic layout of the AMDI-QKD protocol [34]
can be seen in Fig. 1. The protocol runs as follows:
1. Each of Alice and Bob generates m signals with
their on-demand entanglement sources SAC and
SBC, respectively. One mode of each signal is sent
to Charlie’s QND measurement simultaneously via
the quantum channel, using a multiplexing tech-
nique (e.g. wavelength based). The other mode is
kept by Alice and Bob and they measure it in the
Z or X basis, which they choose with probabilities
pZ and pX = 1− pZ, respectively.
2. Charlie applies QND measurements to the incom-
ing pulses to confirm the arrival of the signals com-
ing from Alice and Bob.
3. Charlie pairs the successfully arriving signals via
optical switches and performs BSMs between sig-
nals coming from the different parties. To be more
precise, if there are, say nA (nB) successfully arriv-
ing signals from Alice (Bob), then Charlie performs
min(nA, nB) BSMs.
4. Charlie announces to Alice and Bob which BSMs
were successful, together with the measurement re-
sult obtained. Here the successful BSM is assumed
to distinguish the Bell states |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉−
|V H〉) and |φ−〉 = 1/√2(|HH〉 − |V V 〉) from the
others, as we consider (see Fig. 3 in Sec. III) a stan-
dard linear-optics implementation of the BSMs.
Here H (V ) represents a horizontally (vertically)
polarized single-photon state.
5. For key generation, Alice and Bob post-select the
events by communicating over an authenticated
classical channel where they used the Z-basis to
measure their modes in step 1 (and in which they
both had a successful photon detection) and also
the corresponding BSM was successful. To make
sure that their key bits are identical, they apply a
bit flip procedure [29]. To be precise, Alice or Bob
flips her or his bits, except for the cases when they
chose the Z basis and Charlie’s BSM outcome was
the state |φ−〉 = 1/√2(|HH〉 − |V V 〉).
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FIG. 1: Schematic layout of the AMDI-QKD protocol us-
ing the entanglement sources SAC and SBC. The distance
between Alice and Bob is denoted by L and we assume that
the untrusted middle node Charlie is located halfway between
them. The parameter m is the number of pulses that each
party sends to Charlie. A QND measurement is performed
by Charlie to confirm the arrival of the signals emitted by
the SAC and SBC sources. Also, Alice and Bob measure their
modes of the sources in the Z or X-basis, which they select
probabilistically, indicated in the figure by the symbol (Z/X).
Conditioned on the success of the QND measurements, the
surviving signals are paired via optical switches (SW) and
Bell state measurements (BSM) are performed between all
the pairs by Charlie.
B. Secret key rate formula
The secret key rate formula for the protocol above has
been derived in [34] when the number of multiplexing m
tends to infinity. It reads:
3R = p2Z ps pBSM [1− f h(eZ)− h(eX)], (1)
where ps is the probability that Charlie’s QND and
the Z measurements are both successful either at Al-
ice’s or Bob’s site. The quantity pBSM represents the
success probability of one BSM. The quantities eZ and
eX, on the other hand denote the bit and phase er-
ror rates, respectively. The parameter f is an inef-
ficiency function for the error correction process and
h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary en-
tropy function. We remark that the fact that in Eq. (1)
only ps rather than the square of it appears is due to the
advantage that the original AMDI-QKD protocol offers,
that is, BSMs are only performed between signals that
survived the channel loss. Therefore, a particular signal
only needs to survive travelling through one path [34].
We also note that since we evaluate the secret key rate
in the asymptotic regime where m → ∞, the parties
perform steps 1-5 of the protocol only once. Also, for
simplicity, we assume that pZ  pX, so that we take
p2Z ≈ 1 in Eq. (1) for the simulations below. Moreover,
we assume for simplicity that f = 1.
The full-mode analysis of the AMDI-QKD protocol de-
scribed above can be found in Appendix B, based on
Eq. (1) and the device models described in the next sec-
tion.
III. DEVICE MODELS
Here, we describe the mathematical models that we
use to characterise the behavior of the different devices
employed to evaluate the performance of the AMDI-QKD
protocol.
A. Photonic sources
We shall assume that all entanglement sources emit
states of the following form:
|ψ〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn |φn〉, (2)
where
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1 and pn ≥ 0. The n-photon pair
states |φn〉 are given by
|φn〉 = 1
n!
√
n+ 1
(x†Hy
†
H + x
†
V y
†
V )
n|0〉, (3)
where x†H and y
†
H (x
†
V and y
†
V ) are the creation opera-
tors of horizontally (vertically) polarized photons in the
modes x and y, respectively and |0〉 denotes the vacuum
state.
We note that if we choose p1 = 1 (i.e., pn = 0 for any
n 6= 1) then Eq. (2) represents a perfect entanglement
source that is capable of emitting maximally entangled
states |φ1〉 with certainty. Another interesting special
case is when
pn =
(n+ 1)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
, (4)
holds, in which case Eq. (2) describes a type-II PDC
source [38] with λ being a positive parameter, related to
the amplitude of the pumping laser.
B. Detectors
We shall assume that all the detectors are PNR de-
tectors, characterized by the following positive operator-
valued measure (POVM) elements
Πk =
∞∑
n=k
(
n
k
)
ηkdet(1− ηdet)n−k|n〉〈n|, (5)
with k = 0, 1, · · · ,∞ denoting the number of detected
photons. In Eq. (5), the parameter ηdet is the detection
efficiency of the detectors and |n〉 is the n-photon Fock
state. We note that for simplicity in Eq. (5) we have
disregarded the dark count probability of the PNR de-
tectors.
C. QND measurement
A linear-optics teleportation-based implementation of
the QND measurement can be seen in Fig. 2. It con-
sists of a standard linear-optics BSM module together
with an entanglement source SQND that emits the state
described in Eq. (2). The purpose of the QND measure-
ment module is to herald if a photon successfully arrived
at Charlie’s node, so that, in this case, he can continue
the protocol with performing his BSMs. The successful
heralding events are constituted by the same detection
patterns as in the original MDI-QKD protocol [29], that
is, a successful heralding event occurs if the detectors de-
tect exactly one photon in horizontal polarization and
one photon in vertical polarization. The setup is based
on quantum teleportation. Indeed, in the case of a single-
photon input and SQND being a perfect EPR source with
p1 = 1, the QND module teleports its input mode to its
output mode [39]. We note that there exist more efficient
implementations of a BSM [40, 41] in terms of the suc-
cess probability (which can approach 1 instead of 1/2 as
in the scheme shown in Fig. 2), but they come with the
overhead of the need for complicated ancilla states.
4PBS PBS
50:50 BS
Output mode Input mode
SQND
D1H D1V D2V D2H
BSM
FIG. 2: Linear-optics teleportation-based implementation of
a QND measurement. The symbol SQND denotes an entan-
glement source. The optical devices involved are 50:50 beam
splitters (BS), polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and PNR de-
tectors (D1H, D1V, D2H, D2V) that project into horizontal
(H) or vertical (V ) polarization. A successful detection event,
heralding the arrival of a photon, corresponds to observing ex-
actly one photon in H polarization and one photon in V po-
larization (i.e., altogether two photons). If D1H and D2V, or
D1V and D2H, detect one photon each, this corresponds to a
projection into the singlet state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉− |V H〉),
while if D1H and D1V, or D2H and D2V, detect one photon
each, that corresponds to a projection into the triplet state
|ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 + |V H〉). In the case of a successful de-
tection event, the state of the input photon is teleported to
the output mode (up to a unitary transformation).
D. Optical switches
Charlie directs the successfully arriving signals into his
BSMs with the help of optical switches. For this, an
active feedforward mechanism is required since it takes
time to align the ports of the switches properly, so that
successful signals from Alice and Bob end up in the same
BSM at Charlie’s site. It is assumed that one active
feedforward takes time τ , during which signals propagate
in optical fibers. Therefore, the feedforward procedure
can be modelled as a lossy channel with transmittance
ηf = exp(−τc/Latt) due to the propagation of the signals
through the fibers, where c denotes the speed of light in
the optical fiber. Otherwise, we assume perfect switching
devices with unlimited number of entries.
E. BSM modules after the switches
In this case, the linear-optics implementation of the
middle BSM modules is depicted in Fig. 3. Similarly to
the QND module, the success events are constituted by
the same detection patterns as in the original MDI-QKD
protocol [29]. Note, however, that this middle BSM mod-
ule differs from the one used in the QND measurement.
Here, Hadamard gates (denoted in Fig. 3 by H) are ap-
plied [36], whose operation can be described as[
y†H
y†V
]
=
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
] [
x†H
x†V
]
, (6)
where y†H (y
†
V ) and x
†
H (x
†
V ) are the creation operators
of the input and output modes of the Hadamard gate in
horizontal (vertical) polarization.
PBS PBS
50:50 BS
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FIG. 3: Linear-optics implementation of the middle BSMs af-
ter the switches. The optical devices involved are 50:50 beam
splitters (BS), Hadamard gates (H), polarizing beam splitters
(PBS) and PNR detectors (D1H, D1V, D2H, D2V) that project
into horizontal (H) or vertical (V ) polarization. A successful
detection event corresponds to observing exactly one photon
in H polarization and one photon in V polarization (i.e., alto-
gether two photons). IfD1H andD2V, orD1V andD2H, detect
one photon each, this corresponds to a projection into the sin-
glet state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉−|V H〉), while if D1H and D1V,
or D2H and D2V, detect one photon each, that corresponds
to a projection into the state |φ−〉 = 1/√2(|HH〉 − |V V 〉).
Including the Hadamard gates is advantageous, since
they can prevent errors that can occur otherwise. For
example, when the source SQND emits a two-photon pair
state and the input of the QND module is the vacuum
state, a successful heralding event can still occur, despite
of the fact that the signal coming from the correspond-
ing party was lost. In this scenario, it can be shown (see
Appendix A) that the output state of the QND measure-
ment, heading towards the middle BSM, is a two photon
signal consisting of one vertically and one horizontally
polarized photon. Now, without the Hadamard gates,
this state could give a successful detection event at the
middle BSM, which is undesired since there was no signal
received from the party connected to the seemingly suc-
cessful QND measurement. Intuitively, one expects that
adding the Hadamard gates, i.e., rotating the signal, will
just decrease the chance of the two photons ending up in
detectors corresponding to different polarizations. This
is so because, after the rotation, it is not predetermined
any more which detector they hit after the polarizing
beam splitter, and it rather becomes a probabilistic pro-
cess. However, carrying out the calculation shows (see
5Appendix A) that, in fact, the Hadamard gates force the
spurious two photon signal to give non-conclusive detec-
tion events at the final BSM, which is the best possible
scenario.
F. Quantum channel
For concreteness, we assume that the quantum channel
connecting Alice (Bob) to Charlie is an optical fiber with
attenuation length Latt and transmittance
ηch = exp
[
− L
2Latt
]
, (7)
where L is the distance between Alice and Bob, and
Latt = 10 dB/(α log 10), where log denotes the natural
logarithm and α is the loss coefficient of the channel mea-
sured in dB/km. For simplicity, we do not consider any
misalignment effect in our system.
Using the above devices, we can summarize the dif-
ferences between the AMDI-QKD scheme considered in
this paper and the original proposal. In particular,
here we have replaced both the perfect entanglement
source for the QND measurement and the perfect single-
photon sources of Alice and Bob in the original AMDI-
QKD [34] by more realistic entanglement sources, de-
scribed by Eq. (2), which have non-zero probability of
emitting multiple-photon signals in general. Note that
the single-photon sources possessed by Alice and Bob are
achieved in our scheme by measuring one mode of their
entanglement sources. Another modification is to change
all the threshold detectors, which were in the BSM and
the QND measurement, to PNR detectors. Apart from
these, the protocol, of course, runs in a similar manner
as in the original proposal [34], described in Sec. II A.
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS
In this section, we first derive a simple but non-trivial
analytical necessary condition on the photon-number
statistics of the sources for the AMDI-QKD protocol to
be able to beat the repeaterless bound reported in [5],
which is given by the formula − log2(1 − η2ch). For this,
we use the fact that, if one cannot beat the bound with
ηdet = 1 and τ = 0 s, then it is also impossible to beat
it with ηdet < 1 and τ > 0 s, since the secret key rate
cannot increase with lower efficiency detectors. Thus, we
can construct the necessary condition by requiring that
the bound in [5] is overcome when we set ηdet = 1 and
τ = 0 s, which significantly simplifies the secret key rate
formula, making the derivation of an analytical result
possible. With this simple necessary condition, it is al-
ready possible to show that PDC sources cannot beat the
repeaterless bound with the AMDI-QKD protocol.
Afterwards, we consider the general case where ηdet <
1 and τ > 0 s. In this scenario we can only obtain the con-
dition on the sources to beat the repeaterless bound by
numerically evaluating the secret key rate formula, given
by Eq. (1). The required formulas to evaluate Eq. (1)
can be found in Appendix B.
By comparing the two results, we see that the finite de-
tection efficiency of the detectors has a significant impact
on the required photon-number statistics of the sources.
To be precise, when the detection efficiency of the detec-
tors decreases, then the requirements on the maximum
values of the multi-photon probabilities of the sources
become more severe.
A. Simple analytical necessary condition
When we set ηdet = 1 and τ = 0 s, we find that the
secret key rate formula can be written as (for the details
of the calculation see Appendix B):
R[ηdet=1, τ=0] =
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
8 q2 + 4 (3 q1 − 2 q2) ηch , (8)
where the pn (qm) values represent the photon-number
statistics of the sources SAC and SBC (S
QND). We re-
mark that we can choose the values of pn to be equal
for the sources SAC and SBC because Charlie is located
halfway between them, and such selection is optimal in
this scenario. Importantly, we note that in Eq. (8) only
the probabilities p1, q1 and q2 appear. This is so because
of the following. The appearance of p1 and q1 is the con-
sequence of the fact that only single-photon pairs can give
rise to true success events. Using unit efficiency detec-
tors, the only possible way for multiple-photon pairs to
cause a seemingly successful QND measurement is when
the SQND source emits the state |φ2〉 and the signal from
Alice (Bob) is lost during the transmission through the
optical fiber, which explains the appearance of q2.
From Eq. (8) we learn, that in the case of the use of
detectors with unit efficiency, in the asymptotic limit of
L→∞ (i.e., ηch → 0), R[ηdet=1, τ=0] ' 3 p1 q21/(8 q2) η2ch,
which means that choosing the parameters p1, q1 and q2
properly, we can actually beat the repeaterless bound [5]
in this limit. The reason why the secret key rate never
breaks down in the unit efficiency detector case is due
to the fact that we have neglected dark counts and mis-
alignment in the quantum channel.
Claim. To beat the repeaterless bound [5] with the
AMDI-QKD protocol, using PNR detectors and entan-
glement sources SAC and SBC (S
QND) of the form given
by Eq. (2), with photon-number statistics pn (qm), it is
necessary that
q2 ≤ min
(
25
96
p1 q
2
1 , 1− q1
)
, (9)
6is fulfilled.
Proof. Making use of the Taylor expansion, the follow-
ing inequality trivially holds for the repeaterless bound,
reported in [5]:
− log2(1− η2ch) =
∞∑
n=1
η2nch
n ln 2
≥ 1.44η2ch. (10)
Then, for the necessary condition, we require that
R[ηdet=1, τ=0], given by Eq. (8), is greater than 1.44 η
2
ch.
If (3q1−2q2) ≤ 0 holds for the sources, an upper bound
can be given on R[ηdet=1, τ=0] by plugging ηch = 1 in the
denominator of Eq. (8):
R[ηdet=1, τ=0] =
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
8 q2 + 4 (3 q1 − 2 q2) ηch ≤
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
12 q1
=
p1 q1η
2
ch
4
≤ η
2
ch
4
≤ 1.44η2ch. (11)
Therefore, to be able to overcome the repeaterless
bound [5], (3q1 − 2q2) > 0 must hold, which means
that we can upper bound the secret key rate by plug-
ging ηch = 0 in the denominator of Eq. (8):
R[ηdet=1, τ=0] =
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
8 q2 + 4 (3 q1 − 2 q2) ηch ≤
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
8 q2
.
(12)
For the necessary condition it is then required that
3 p1 q
2
1 η
2
ch
8 q2
≥ 1.44 η2ch, (13)
holds, which can be simplified to
q2 ≤ 25 p1 q
2
1
96
. (14)
This inequality is tighter than (3q1−2q2) > 0. Moreover,
since
∑∞
m=0 qm = 1, we have that
q2 ≤ 1− q1. (15)
Considering this validity condition, we obtain the simple
necessary condition given by Eq. (9).
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FIG. 4: The maximal allowable value of q2 as a function of p1
and q1, which is necessary for the sources to be able to beat
the repeaterless bound [5] with the AMDI-QKD protocol.
The necessary condition, given by Eq. (9), is depicted
in Fig. 4, where we plot the value of q2, above which it is
not possible to beat the bound [5], given the values of p1
and q1. We can see that the necessary condition is more
sensitive to the value of q1, than to the value of p1 in the
sense that if q1 is too small then no matter how large we
set p1, we need to have q2 = 0 (purple area in Fig. 4).
However, in the converse situation, having p1 small does
not imply that q2 = 0. One can also see this formally
by noting that in Eq. (9) only q1 appears squared. This
is so, because, as explained before, even in the ideal effi-
ciency detector case the source SQND can cause errors by
introducing two-photon pair signals. While the sources
SAC and SBC cannot, since the detectors in the Z/X
measurement filter out all the two-photon pair signals.
Corollary. Using PDC sources, it is impossible to beat
the repeaterless bound [5] with the AMDI-QKD protocol.
Proof. The photon-number statistics of the PDC sources
can be written as
pPDCn =
(n+ 1)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
and qPDCm =
(m + 1)µm
(1 + µ)m+2
, (16)
where, as already mentioned previously, λ (µ) is a posi-
tive parameter, related to the amplitude of the laser used
to pump the sources SAC and SBC (S
QND). We note that
due to the symmetries of the setup, that is, Charlie is lo-
cated halfway between Alice and Bob, we can set the λ
values for the sources SAC and SBC equal.
Plugging Eq. (16) into Eq. (9), we have that
λ
(1 + λ)3 (1 + µ)2
≥ 36
25
(17)
is necessary to overcome the repeaterless bound [5]. How-
ever, since (1 + µ)−2 < 1 and max{λ (1 + λ)−3} = 4/27
7(the latter can be seen easily by taking the derivative
with respect to λ), we have that
λ
(1 + λ)3 (1 + µ)2
≤ 4
27
, (18)
which obviously contradicts Eq. (17), meaning that for
PDC sources the necessary condition cannot be fulfilled.
Therefore, it is impossible to overcome the repeaterless
bound [5].
B. Tighter necessary condition
In this section, we now analyse the necessary condition
without the assumption of ηdet = 1 and τ = 0 s. For
this, we numerically evaluate the general secret key rate
formula derived in Appendix B.
For simplicity, however, in the simulations, we restrict
ourselves to the case where every source emits at most
two photon pairs, that is, we set qn = pn = 0 for any n ≥
3. We remark, however, that, with the general secret key
rate formula given in Appendix B, it is possible to allow
for an arbitrary number of emitted photon pairs if one has
sufficient computational power. The results can be seen
in Fig. 5. We introduced the quantities P ≡ p2/p1 and
Q ≡ q2/q1 to characterise the quality of the sources, lower
values meaning higher quality sources since emitting two
photon pairs is less likely than emitting the desired EPR
pair, for given values of p0 and q0.
Let Qmax[ηdet,τ ] denote the maximally allowable value of
Q to be able to overcome the bound [5], as a function of
p0 and P , given the parameters ηdet and τ . In Fig. 5,
we plot the quantity Qmax[ηdet<1, τ=67 ns]/Q
max
[ηdet=1, τ=0 ns]
as
a function of p0 and P for different values of ηdet < 1,
given the value of q0. So that we can observe how does
the Qmax value decreases for a given p0 and P if we have
ηdet < 1 and τ = 67 ns, compared to the ηdet = 1 and
τ = 0 ns case. We set τ = 67 ns as illustration, since
this is the value used in the original implementation [34],
based on the experiments reported in [42, 43]. Our sim-
ulations show that the value of q0 does not influence
significantly the order of magnitude tendencies observed
while decreasing the detection efficiency of the detectors.
Loosely speaking, varying the value of q0 only translates
the secret key rate curve vertically (i.e., the secret key
rate basically decreases by a constant factor for all val-
ues of the channel loss) for given P and p0 values. This
means that in the comparison, every curve for the differ-
ent detection efficiencies will be translated by the same
factor, therefore, for a different q0 value, the Q
max values
will also be altered by a common factor for each detec-
tion efficiency, and since we are plotting their quotients,
it means that the plots on Fig. 5 will stay very similar.
P
p 0
(a)
P
p 0
(b)
P
p 0
(c)
FIG. 5: Comparison of the analytically obtained necessary
condition using the unit efficiency assumption and τ = 0 ns
to the numerically obtained necessary condition when τ =
67 ns [34, 42, 43] and (a) ηdet = 0.9, (b) ηdet = 0.7 and
(c) ηdet = 0.5. In each figure, the quantity plotted is
Qmax[ηdet, 67 ns]/Q
max
[1, 0 ns] as a function of p0 and P ≡ p2/p1. The
quantity Qmax[ηdet,τ ] denotes the maximally allowable value of
Q ≡ q2/q1 in order to overcome the bound [5]. Moreover, for
the simulations, we assume that Latt = 22 km, c = 2 · 108 m/s
and q0 = 0.2. See the main text for further details.
First, let us examine the region of the plots where
P ≈ 0 (reddish areas in Fig. 5), which means that the
sources of Alice and Bob are close to perfect entangle-
ment sources. We see that decreasing the value of ηdet
from 1 to 0.9, 0.7 and 0.5 results in the need for about
an order of magnitude higher quality sources at Char-
lie’s hand for each efficiency compared to the previous
8one. This is partly due to fact that eight detections are
needed for obtaining a raw key bit (one in the Z/X mea-
surement of each Alice and Bob, two in the QND mea-
surement at each side and two more in the BSM), there-
fore, now we have a factor of η8det < 1 in the probability
of each key generation event, but this only translates the
secret key rate curve vertically. On top of this, and what
is more important, we now have an increased probabil-
ity of obtaining erroneous key generation events from the
two-photon pair component of the sources SQND. To see
this, suppose that one of the sources SQND on Alice’s side
emits a two-photon pair signal and all the other sources
emit one-photon pair signals, and suppose that the signal
from Alice towards the QND measurement is lost in the
transmission. In this case, as already mentioned previ-
ously, we can get a seemingly successful detection event
if one photon out of the two going from the QND module
towards the BSM is lost in the detection process of the
BSM, which happens with a probability 1 − ηdet. Thus,
the error rate will increase as we decrease the detection
efficiency. The only way to compensate this error is to
have better quality sources at Charlie’s hand (meaning
lower Q values).
Now, let us observe the part of the plots, where P ≈
0.25 (purplish areas in Fig. 5), meaning that Alice and
Bob no longer have perfect entanglement sources. In this
case, we find that the more we decrease the value of ηdet
the more the values of Qmax[ηdet<1, τ=67 ns]/Q
max
[ηdet=1, τ=0 ns]
in the region of P ≈ 0.25 will decrease compared to the
values in the region of P ≈ 0. In other words, in the
P ≈ 0.25 region the Qmax[ηdet<1, τ=67 ns]/Qmax[ηdet=1, τ=0 ns] val-
ues do not decrease linearly with ηdet, which is more or
less true in the P ≈ 0 region. What has been said before
for the region P ≈ 0 is true for this region as well, but,
on top of those effects, since P > 0, the sources of Alice
and Bob now have a non-zero probability of producing er-
roneous successful detections in the Z/X measurements
due to their two-photon pair component, which was not
possible before in the P ≈ 0 region. Consider the previ-
ously explained situation with the difference, that Alice’s
source now emits a two-photon pair signal and both pho-
tons from Alice heading towards the QND module are
lost in the transmission. In this case we can only get a
seemingly successful raw key generation event if one pho-
ton out of the two in the Z/X measurement at Alice’s
site is lost in the detection, which occurs with a proba-
bility 1− ηdet. Thus, the probability of this type of error
scales with (1 − ηdet)2 (the other 1 − ηdet factor comes
from the fact that in the scenario considered, we need to
lose one more photon in the detection process of the BSM
to have a seemingly successful raw key generation event),
meaning that it does not depend linearly on the detec-
tion efficiency as in the P ≈ 0 region, which explains the
observed behaviour for the P ≈ 0.25 region. From this,
we can see that, as expected, P has a more significant
impact on the Qmax values than p0, which, since increas-
ing p0 will not increase the probabilities of an error, just
translates the secret key rate curve vertically. These are
the main reasons behind this dramatic increase in the
quality of Charlie’s sources as we decrease ηdet.
Summing up the observations from Fig. 5 we can say
that the necessary quality of the sources can be much
higher than what is expected from the unit detection ef-
ficiency condition if we have non-perfect detectors. We
also note that using the formulas for the secret key rate
from Appendix B, Fig. 5 can be easily made for arbitrary
0 ≤ q0 < 1 and 0 < ηdet ≤ 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the performance of a more real-
istic implementation of the original AMDI-QKD proto-
col [34], assuming that the parties have access to a broad
class of entanglement sources of the form given by Eq. (2)
and photon-number resolving (PNR) detectors. We have
shown that the improved ηch scaling (with ηch being the
transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob
to Charlie), offered by the protocol, is very sensitive to
multiple-photon pair components emitted by the sources.
More precisely, we have derived a simple non-trivial an-
alytical necessary condition on the photon-number statis-
tics of the entanglement sources to be able to overcome
the repeaterless bound [5] with the AMDI-QKD protocol.
With this condition, we have demonstrated analytically
that employing the widely available parametric down-
conversion sources does not enable the protocol to beat
the repeaterless bound. Furthermore, we have quanti-
tatively investigated the effect that the finite detection
efficiency of the detectors have on the required photon-
number statistics of the sources. In this regard, we have
shown that, when the detection efficiency of the detec-
tors decreases, then the maximum tolerable values of the
multi-photon probabilities of the sources in order to beat
the repeaterless bound become significantly more severe.
This latter study, however, was only feasible by numeri-
cally evaluating the secret key rate formula of the proto-
col.
Our results suggest, that, while the AMDI-QKD pro-
tocol could in principle overcome the repeaterless bound
with idealized devices, in practice it demands very high
quality entanglement sources, which are thus still chal-
lenging to realize with current technology, besides, of
course, the involved multiplexing techniques depending
on the channel length.
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Appendix A: BSM with Hadamard gates
In this appendix we give an intuitive argument on the
reason why the use of Hadamard gates is advantageous
in the BSM after the optical switches. Suppose that the
state used for key generation is |φ1〉, given by Eq. (3). If
every source emits this state and a successful detection
pattern occurs, the parties share the desired quantum
correlation to obtain their secret key (given that dark
counts are neglected). However, if some of the sources
emit multiple-photon pair states, for example the state
|φ2〉, also given by Eq. (3), this could result in a seem-
ingly successful detection event, which does not provide
the parties with the desired correlations and will end up
producing errors. As we will show below, including the
Hadamard gates in the BSM removes the possibility of
getting errors from the state |φ2〉.
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50:50 BS
H
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D3H
D3V
D4V
D4H
BSM
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h’
h
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D1H
D1V
D2V
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SQNDc
d
e
b
QND measurement
a f
Bob
QND + Z/X module
Alice
FIG. 6: Schematic of the optical modes used in Appendix A.
We use 50:50 beam splitters (BS), PNR detectors (D1H, D1V,
D2H, D2V, D3H, D3V, D4H, D4V) with detection efficiency
ηdet and polarizing beam splitters (PBS) that project into
horizontal (H) or vertical (V ) polarization. Optical modes
are denoted by italic letters.
Let us illustrate this with an example depicted in
Fig. 6. In particular, let us consider the situation when
SAC emits the state |φ1〉 and there is a correct detec-
tion in Alice’s Z/X measurement but the photon in the
other mode (mode a in Fig. 6), going towards the QND
measurement, is lost in the transmission. Moreover, sup-
pose that the SQND source on Alice’s side emits the |φ2〉
state, which can cause a seemingly successful QND mea-
surement on Alice’s side and also a seemingly successful
BSM at Charlie’s site.
Furthermore, suppose that the sources SBC and S
QND
on Bob’s side both emit the |φ1〉 state. Let us assume
that these signals cause successful Z/X and QND mea-
surements on Bob’s side, but the photon in the other
mode (mode f in Fig. 6), going from the SQND source to-
wards Charlie’s BSM module, is lost, say during the feed-
forward mechanism. Therefore, in this example, there is
no actual signal coming from Bob to the BSM. This way,
if the Hadamard gates are not used, it is possible that the
|φ2〉 state coming from the SQND source on Alice’s side
will result in a seemingly successful BSM. Consequently,
the parties would conclude that the protocol had run cor-
rectly and they can obtain a secret key bit, but in reality,
they will get random outcomes instead of correlated ones.
Next, we show that this cannot occur in the presence of
the Hadamard gates.
For simplicity, instead of |φ2〉, we assume that the
source SQND on Alice’s side emits the following unnor-
malised state
|φ′2〉 = 2
√
3|φ2〉 = (b†He†H + b†V e†V )2|0〉
=
[
(b†H)
2(e†H)
2 + (b†V )
2(e†V )
2 + 2b†Hb
†
V e
†
He
†
V
]
|0〉. (A1)
The QND measurement is successful if there are ex-
actly two, orthogonally polarized photons in the modes
c and d (see Fig. 6):
c†Hd
†
V =
1
2
(
a†Ha
†
V + a
†
V b
†
H − a†Hb†V − b†Hb†V
)
,
c†Hc
†
V =
1
2
(
a†Ha
†
V + a
†
V b
†
H + a
†
Hb
†
V + b
†
Hb
†
V
)
,
c†V d
†
H =
1
2
(
a†Ha
†
V − a†V b†H + a†Hb†V − b†Hb†V
)
,
d†Hd
†
V =
1
2
(
a†Ha
†
V − a†V b†H − a†Hb†V + b†Hb†V
)
, (A2)
where we expressed the output modes c and d after the
50:50 BS in the QND measurement as a function of the
input modes a and b. As explained above, in the partic-
ular example considered, there is no photon in mode a.
Therefore, a successful event could only be caused by the
b†Hb
†
V component from Eq. (A2). Comparing with |φ′2〉
in Eq. (A1), we conclude, that if the QND measurement
on Alice’s side succeeded, then the state in mode e has
to be characterised by e†He
†
V .
As explained previously, there is no photon in mode f
(coming from Bob). This means that, since there is one
horizontally and one vertically polarized photon incident
on the 50:50 BS in the BSM (mode e), a successful de-
tection pattern in the BSM is easily produced, if there
are no Hadamard gates.
Now, let us consider what happens with the Hadamard
gates. Similarly to the QND measurement, the BSM is
successful if there are exactly two, orthogonally polarized
photons in the modes g and h:
g†Hg
†
V =
(e†H)
2
4
− (e
†
V )
2
4
+
e†Hf
†
H
2
+
(f†H)
2
4
− e
†
V f
†
V
2
− (f
†
V )
2
4
, (A3)
g†Hh
†
V =
(e†H)
2
4
− (e
†
V )
2
4
− e
†
V f
†
H
2
− (f
†
H)
2
4
+
e†Hf
†
V
2
+
(f†V )
2
4
, (A4)
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h†V h
†
H =
(e†H)
2
4
− (e
†
V )
2
4
− e
†
Hf
†
H
2
+
(f†H)
2
4
+
e†V f
†
V
2
− (f
†
V )
2
4
, (A5)
g†V h
†
H =
(e†H)
2
4
− (e
†
V )
2
4
+
e†V f
†
H
2
− (f
†
H)
2
4
− e
†
Hf
†
V
2
+
(f†V )
2
4
, (A6)
where we expressed the modes g and h after the
Hadamard gates as a function of the input modes e and
f . In doing so, we used the matrices describing the quan-
tum optical operation of the BS and the Hadamard gate.
It is clear that in this example, the state e†He
†
V , which we
have after the seemingly successful QND measurement,
cannot cause a successful BSM, since in Eqs. (A3)-(A6)
there is no component that contains e†He
†
V . Therefore,
the error that was possible before is now filtered out by
the Hadamard gates.
Appendix B: Full-mode analysis
1. Rephrasing the secret key rate formula
The secret key rate formula, given by Eq. (1), can be
written as [34]
R = ps pBSM [1− h(eZ)− h(eX)] , (B1)
where we have set f = 1. Also, as explained in the
main text, we assume that pZ ≈ 1 since we consider the
asymptotic scenario. We remind the reader that ps is the
probability that Charlie’s QND and the Z/X measure-
ments are both successful either at Alice’s or Bob’s site.
The quantity pBSM represents the success probability of
one BSM. We note that since the Z-basis is used for the
key generation the above quantities are defined in the
case when Alice and Bob choose the Z-basis. We also
note that the probabilities ps and pBSM by definition in-
clude all the possible detection patterns that constitute
that particular success event.
However, due to the symmetries of the channel model,
for our simulations, it is not necessary to calculate the
probabilities of all the detection patterns that constitute
a certain event, which would be rather tedious and re-
dundant. Thus, in the remainder of this section, we are
going to relate the quantities ps, pBSM, eZ and eX to the
probabilities of some particular detection patterns, rely-
ing on the symmetries of the channel model.
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FIG. 7: Layout of the QND and Z measurements. We use
50:50 beam splitters (BS), PNR detectors (D1H, D1V, D2H,
D2V, D3H, D3V) with detection efficiency ηdet and polarizing
beam splitters (PBS) that project into horizontal (H) or ver-
tical (V ) polarization. The quantum channel is modeled by
a BS with transmittance ηch = exp(−L/(2Latt)), where Latt
is the attenuation length of the optical fiber and L/2 is the
distance between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. The entanglement
sources are denoted by SAC and S
QND. Note, that if Alice
(Bob) chooses to measure in the X-basis, then a Hadamard
gate is applied to mode a. Optical modes are denoted by italic
letters.
First, let pQND denote the probability that there is
exactly one photon detected in each of the detectors
D2H, D2V and D3H and zero photons detected in the
other detectors D1H, D1V and D3V in Fig. 7. Note that
this means a successful QND measurement and simul-
taneously a successful Z measurement on Alice’s side,
where she obtained the horizontal (H) polarization, and
therefore this particular detection pattern represents one
of the patterns that constitute ps. A successful QND
measurement can be realized by four different detection
patterns (observing altogether two photons in the QND
module, one in H polarization and one in V polariza-
tion, i.e., if D1H and D2V, or D1V and D2H, or D1H and
D1V, or D2H and D2V in Fig. 7 detect one photon each).
The Z measurement can be realized by two different de-
tection patterns (one photon detected in either D3H or
D3V in Fig. 7). Altogether, this means eight different
possibilities. Note that these eight detection patterns all
have the same probability due to the symmetries of the
channel model considered. Moreover, pQND is also inde-
pendent of the basis choice of Alice. Therefore, we can
write that
ps = 8 pQND. (B2)
Now, let us also express pBSM with probabilities corre-
sponding to particular detection patterns. For this, first,
let pZc (correct) denote the probability of the following
particular detection pattern given that the parties choose
to measure their local modes in the Z-basis. Suppose
that Charlie’s QND and the Z measurement were suc-
cessful on both Alice’s and Bob’s side with the particular
detection pattern described before for pQND (i.e., both
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parties detected H polarization) and then in the BSM
after the optical switches there is exactly one photon de-
tected in each of the detectors D2H and D2V and zero
photons detected in the other detectors D1H and D1V in
Fig. 8. Note, that this detection pattern corresponds to
a projection into the Bell state |φ−〉, which means that
the parties will not apply bit flip, this way obtaining cor-
related (correct) raw key bits. The success probability
of the BSM alone, corresponding to the above described
particular detection pattern can be written as pZc /p
2
QND.
We also note that in the BSM after the switches there
is another detection pattern that corresponds to obtain-
ing correlated (correct) raw key bits (projection into the
Bell state |φ−〉), which happens when there is one pho-
ton detected in both D1H and D1V and zero photons de-
tected in D2H and D2V in Fig. 8. Due to the symmetries,
this particular click pattern will also have probability pZc .
Therefore, the contribution to pBSM in this case will be
2 pZc /p
2
QND.
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c
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f
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h
FIG. 8: Layout for the BSM after the optical switches. We
use 50:50 beam splitters (BS), Hadamard gates (H), PNR
detectors (D1H, D1V, D2H, D2V) with detection efficiency
η′det = ηdetηf and polarizing beam splitters (PBS) that project
into horizontal (H) or vertical (V ) polarization. Here ηf is the
channel loss that corresponds to the active feedforward mech-
anism and in our calculations it has been incorporated into
the detection efficiency. Optical modes are denoted by italic
letters.
Now, let us define pZnc (non-correct) in the same way
as we defined pZc , with the only difference being that in
the BSM after the optical switches there is exactly one
photon detected in each of the detectors D2H and D1V
and zero photons detected in the other detectors D1H and
D2V in Fig. 8. Note that this particular detection pat-
tern corresponds to a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉,
meaning that one of the parties will apply a bit flip, there-
fore obtaining anti-correlated (non-correct) raw key bits.
Similarly to pZc , there is another detection pattern that
corresponds to obtaining the same anti-correlated raw
key bits (one photon detected in both D1H and D2V and
zero photons detected in D1V and D2H in Fig. 8). Again,
due to the symmetries, this particular click pattern will
also have pZnc probability, therefore the contribution to
pBSM is 2 p
Z
nc/p
2
QND in this case.
The quantity eX can be defined and calculated, simi-
larly to the case for eZ, by considering probabilities with
which agreed and disagreed bits are adopted by Alice and
Bob. However, for clarity, here we use another method
to calculate eX. Choosing the X-basis means that the
parties apply a Hadamard gate on the mode a in Fig. 7
before their local measurement with detectors D3H and
D3V. From the symmetry of the protocol, without loss
of generality, we can focus on a specific success event of
Charlie where Charlie’s QND measurements on Alice’s
side and Bob’s side announce single-photon detection in
each of the detectors D2H and D2V and zero-photon de-
tection in the other detectors D1H and D1V in Fig. 7,
and Charlie’s final Bell measurement announces single-
photon detection in each of the detectors D2H and D2V
and zero-photon detection in the other detectors D1H and
D1V in Fig. 8. Then, since Alice and Bob would share
entanglement close to |φ−〉, we define pXc (correct) [pXnc
(non-correct)] as a probability with which Charlie obtains
the specific success event and Alice (Bob) detects exactly
one photon in the detector D3H (D3V) [D3H (D3H)] on
her (his) side and zero photons in the other detector in-
cluded in her (his) X measurement in Fig. 7.
With these at our hands, we can write that
pBSM =
2
(
pZc + p
Z
nc
)
p2QND
(B3)
and
eZ =
pZnc
pZc + p
Z
nc
, eX =
pXnc
pXc + p
X
nc
. (B4)
Consequently, we can rewrite Eq. (B1) to the following
form:
R =
16 (pZc + p
Z
nc)
pQND
[
1− h
(
pZnc
pZc + p
Z
nc
)
− h
(
pXnc
pXc + p
X
nc
)]
.
(B5)
The remainder of Appendix B is structured as follows.
In Appendix B 2 we derive pQND, then in Appendix B 3
and Appendix B 4 we derive pZc , p
Z
nc and p
X
c , p
X
nc. And
finally, in B 5 we obtain the secret key rate formula for
the ηdet = 1 and τ = 0 s case.
2. Derivation of pQND
The layout for this derivation can be seen in Fig. 7.
For convenience, we use the density matrix formalism for
the sources. It is easy to see that converting the emit-
ted state |ψ〉, given by Eq. (2), into a density matrix in
the |φn〉-basis, only the diagonal terms will give contri-
butions when calculating the probabilities of the different
detection patterns (described by the POVMs of Eq. (5),
which are diagonal in the Fock basis) since different val-
ues of n represent different photon numbers. This means
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that for our calculations, instead of using the pure states
given by Eq. (2), we can use mixed states of the following
form:
ρAC =
∞∑
n=0
pn |φn〉〈φn|,
ρQND =
∞∑
m=0
qm |ϕm〉〈ϕm|, (B6)
with
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1 and
∑∞
m=0 qm = 1. For the experi-
mental setup considered, the results in both cases (i.e.,
by using Eq. (2) or Eq. (B6)) coincide. The states |φn〉
and |ϕm〉 are given by
|φn〉 = 1
n!
√
n+ 1
(a†Hc
†
H + a
†
V c
†
V )
n|0〉,
|ϕm〉 = 1
m!
√
m+ 1
(f†Hb
†
H + f
†
V b
†
V )
m|0〉, (B7)
where a†H , c
†
H , f
†
H and b
†
H (a
†
V , c
†
V , f
†
V and b
†
V ) are the
creation operators of horizontally (vertically) polarized
photons of the corresponding modes.
Next, we calculate the quantum state from Alice that
enters the 50:50 beam splitter (BS) within the QND mea-
surement after travelling through the quantum channel.
For this, we model the quantum channel by a BS with
transmittance ηch = exp(−L/(2Latt)). In doing so, it
turns out that such a state is given by
ρea =
∞∑
n=0
pn Trd (|φnaed〉〈φnaed|) , (B8)
where the states |φnaed〉 are given by
|φnaed〉 =
1
n!
√
n+ 1
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
(
n
k
)(
k
x
)(
n− k
y
)
√
1− ηchx+y√ηchn−x−ya†kH a†n−kV e†k−xH e†n−k−yV
d†xH d
†y
V |0〉. (B9)
The 50:50 BS combines the states ρea and ρ
QND. So, the
state after the 50:50 BS can be written as
σabgh =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
pn qm Trd
(|ϕnmabghd〉〈ϕnmabghd|) , (B10)
where the pure states |ϕnmabghd〉 have the form of
|ϕnmabghd〉 =
1
n!m!
√
(n+ 1)(m+ 1)
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
(
n
k
)
(
k
x
)(
n− k
y
)(
m
o
)√
1− ηchx+y√ηchn−x−y√
2
n+m−x−y
o∑
u=0
m−o∑
v=0
k−x∑
w=0
n−k−y∑
z=0
(
k − x
w
)(
n− k − y
z
)(
o
u
)(
m− o
v
)
(−1)n−x−y−w−za†kH a†n−kV b†oH b†m−oV g†u+wH g†v+zV
h†o−u+k−x−wH h
†n−k−y−z+m−o−v
V d
†x
H d
†y
V |0〉. (B11)
The quantity pQND is defined (see Appendix B 1) by
the probability of the event that there is exactly one pho-
ton detected in each of the modes gh, gv and ah (detectors
D2H, D2V and D3H in Fig. 7) and zero photons detected
in the modes hh, hv and av (detectors D1H, D1V and
D3V in Fig. 7). This event is described by the following
POVM
ΠQND = Π
gh
1 ⊗Πgv1 ⊗Πhh0 ⊗Πhv0 ⊗Πah1 ⊗Πav0 , (B12)
where we extended the notation used in Eq. (5) with in-
cluding the corresponding optical mode as a superscript.
The unnormalised state that enters Charlie’s BSM
module from Alice (Bob) is then given by
Γb = Trgha (ΠQND σabgh)
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
pn qm Trghad
(
ΠQND |ϕnmabghd〉〈ϕnmabghd|
)
.
(B13)
We repeatedly make use of the following transforma-
tion of the summation indices, whenever we calculate the
trace of an expression.
C∑
A=0
D∑
B=0
f(A,B) =
C+D∑
G=0
min{G,C}∑
A=max{0,G−D}
f(A,G−A),
(B14)
where f is an arbitrary function of the indices A, B and
we introduced the sum G = A + B of the summation
indices. Carrying out the calculations, it can be shown,
by using Eq. (B14), that Γb can be put into the following
form
Γb =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
pn qmγb(n,m), (B15)
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where γb(n,m) can be written as
γb(n,m) =
n∑
k=1
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
o+k−x∑
s=1
m−o+n−k−y∑
t=1
min{o,s}∑
u=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
min{o,s}∑
u′=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v′=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
Λ(n,m, k, x, y, o, s, t, u, v, u′, v′)
|o,m− o〉b〈o,m− o|, (B16)
where |i, j〉b denotes that there are i and j pho-
tons in modes bh and bv, respectively. The quan-
tity Λ(n,m, k, x, y, o, s, t, u, v, u′, v′), on the other hand,
equals to
Λ(n,m, k, x, y, o, s, t, u, v, u′, v′) =
s t k η3det (1− ηdet)2n+m−x−y−3 k! (n− k)! o! (m− o)! s! t! (o+ k − x− s)!
(n+ 1) (m+ 1)x! y! (k − x+ u− s)! (k − x+ u′ − s)! (s− u)! (s− u′)
(n− k − y +m− o− t)! (−1)u+v+u′+v′
(n− k − y + v − t)! (t− v)! (n− k − y + v′ − t)! (t− v′)! (o− u)!u! (o− u′)!u′! (m− o− v)! v! (m− o− v′)! v′!
1
2n+m−x−y
ηn−x−ych (1− ηch)x+y. (B17)
The probability pQND can be obtained as the normal-
ization factor of Γb:
pQND = Tr[Γb] =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
pn qm
n∑
k=1
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
o+k−x∑
s=1
m−o+n−k−y∑
t=1
min{o,s}∑
u=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
min{o,s}∑
u′=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v′=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
Λ(n,m, k, x, y, o, s, t, u, v, u′, v′). (B18)
3. Derivation of pZc and p
Z
nc
The layout for this derivation can be seen in Fig. 8. Us-
ing the previous result for the state coming from the QND
and the Z measurement, which is given by Eq. (B15),
the state that enters Charlie’s BSM module from Alice’s
(Bob’s) side is Γc (Γd). Therefore, their collective state
can be written as
Γc ⊗ Γd =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=1
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qMγc(n,m)⊗ γd(N,M) =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
n∑
k=1
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
o+k−x∑
s=1
m−o+n−k−y∑
t=1
min{o,s}∑
u=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
min{o,s}∑
u′=max{0,s−(k−x)}
min{m−o,t}∑
v′=max{0,t−(n−k−y)}
∞∑
N=1
∞∑
M=0
N∑
K=1
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
O+K−X∑
S=1
M−O+N−K−Y∑
T=1
min{O,S}∑
U=max{0,S−(K−X)}
min{M−O,T}∑
V=max{0,T−(N−K−Y )}
min{O,S}∑
U ′=max{0,S−(K−X)}
min{M−O,T}∑
V ′=max{0,T−(N−K−Y )}
pn qm pN qM Λc Λd
|o,m− o,O,M −O〉cd〈o,m− o,O,M −O| =
=
∑
n,··· ,V ′
pn qm pN qM Λc Λd |o,m− o,O,M −O〉cd〈o,m− o,O,M −O|, (B19)
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where note that upper case indices are used to describe
quantities corresponding to mode d (coming from Bob’s
side), while using lower case indices to describe quanti-
ties corresponding to mode c (coming from Alice’s side).
For simplicity, in Eq. (B19) we introduced the following
notation:
Λc ≡ Λ(n,m, k, x, y, o, s, t, u, v, u′, v′),
Λd ≡ Λ(N,M,K,X, Y,O, S, T, U, V, U ′, V ′). (B20)
For brevity, after the last equation sign in Eq. (B19) we
denoted all the sums collectively by
∑
n,··· ,V ′ . The state
after the 50:50 BS can then be written concisely as
ρef =
∑
n,··· ,V ′
pn qm pN qM Λc Λd|ψomOMef 〉〈ψomOMef |,
(B21)
where the states |ψomOMef 〉 are given by
|ψomOMef 〉 =
1√
o! (m− o)!O! (M −O)!
(
1√
2
)m+M
o∑
l=0
m−o∑
q=0
O∑
L=0
M−O∑
Q=0
(
o
l
)(
O
L
)(
m− o
q
)(
M −O
Q
)
(−1)m−l−qe†o+O−l−LH e†m+M−o−O−q−QV f†l+LH f†q+QV |0〉.
(B22)
Then, the state after the Hadamard gates can be writ-
ten as
ρgh =
∑
n,··· ,V ′
pn qm pN qM Λc Λd|χomOMgh 〉〈χomOMgh |,
(B23)
where the pure states |χomOMgh 〉 have the form
|χomOMgh 〉 =
o∑
l=0
m−o∑
q=0
O∑
L=0
M−O∑
Q=0
l+L∑
α=0
q+Q∑
β=0
o+O−l−L∑
ϕ=0
m+M−o−O−q−Q∑
ε=0
1√
o! (m− o)!O! (M −O)!
(
1
2
)m+M
(−1)M−l−q−o−O−ε−β
(
o
l
)(
O
L
)(
m− o
q
)(
M −O
Q
)(
l + L
α
)(
q +Q
β
)(
o+O − l − L
ϕ
)(
m+M − o−O − q −Q
ε
)
g†α+βH h
†ε+ϕ
H g
†l+L+q+Q−α−β
V h
†m+M−l−L−q−Q−ε−ϕ
V |0〉. (B24)
With Eq. (B14), we can rewrite the states |χomOMgh 〉
into a form, in which it will be more convenient to take
the trace of Eq. (B23):
|χomOMgh 〉 =
m+M∑
I=0
m+M∑
Ω=0
min{I,o+O}∑
i=max{0,I+o+O−m−M}
min{Ω,I}∑
ω=max{0,Ω+I−m−M}
min{i,o}∑
l=max{0,i−O}
min{I−i,m−o}∑
q=max{0,I+O−i−M}
min{ω,i}∑
α=max{0,ω+i−I}
min{Ω−ω,o+O−i}∑
ϕ=max{0,Ω+O+I+o−ω−i−m−M}
√
ω!(I − ω)!(Ω− ω)!(m+M + ω − I − Ω)!
o! (m− o)!O! (M −O)!
(
1
2
)m+M
(−1)M+ϕ+α−l−q−o−O−Ω
(
o
l
)
(
O
i− l
)(
m− o
q
)(
M −O
I − i− q
)(
i
α
)(
I − i
ω − α
)(
o+O − i
ϕ
)(
m+M + i− o−O − I
Ω− ω − ϕ
)
|ω, I − ω,Ω− ω,m+M + ω − I − Ω〉gh. (B25)
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The quantity pZc is defined (see Appendix B 1) by the
probability of the event that, one photon is observed in
each of the modes gh and gv (one detection in each of the
detectors D2H and D2V in Fig. 8) and zero photons are
observed in each of the modes hh and hv (no detection
in neither of the detectors D1H and D1V in Fig. 8)
Similarly, pZnc is by definition equal to the probability
of the event that one photon is observed in each of the
modes gh and hv (one detection in each of the detectors
D2H and D1V in Fig. 8) and zero photons are observed
in each of the modes gv and hh (no detection in neither
of the detectors D1H and D2V in Fig. 8).
These events are described by the following POVMs
Πc = Π
gh
1 ⊗Πgv1 ⊗Πhh0 ⊗Πhv0 , (B26)
and
Πnc = Π
gh
1 ⊗Πgv0 ⊗Πhh0 ⊗Πhv1 . (B27)
Since for convenience in the calculations we incorporate
the loss corresponding to the active feedforward mech-
anism into the efficiency of the detectors in the BSM
module, the efficiency becomes
η′det = ηdetηf , with ηf = exp(− c τ/Latt). (B28)
This is the efficiency assumed in the POVM elements
given by Eq. (B26) and Eq. (B27), where τ is the neces-
sary time for performing one active feedforward and c is
the speed of light in the optical fiber.
Therefore, pZc and p
Z
nc can be calculated as follows
pZc = Trgh (Πc ρgh) , (B29)
and
pZnc = Trgh (Πnc ρgh) , (B30)
with ρgh given by Eq. (B23). Carrying out the calcula-
tions and plugging all the indices back in, we find that
pZc and p
Z
nc are given by the following formulas:
pZc =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=1
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qM
n∑
k=1
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
o+k−x∑
s=1
m−o+n−k−y∑
t=1
min{o,s}∑
u=max{0,s+x−k}
min{m−o,t}∑
v=max{0,t+k+y−n}
min{o,s}∑
u′=max{0,s+x−k}
min{m−o,t}∑
v′=max{0,t+k+y−n}
N∑
K=1
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
O+K−X∑
S=1
M−O+N−K−Y∑
T=1
min{O,S}∑
U=max{0,S+X−K}
min{M−O,T}∑
V=max{0,T+K+Y−N}
min{O,S}∑
U ′=max{0,S+X−K}
min{M−O,T}∑
V ′=max{0,T+K+Y−N}
Λc Λd
m+M∑
I=1
m+M∑
Ω=1
min{I,o+O}∑
i=max{0,I+o+O−m−M}
min{Ω,I−1}∑
ω=max{1,Ω+I−m−M}
min{i,o}∑
l=max{0,i−O}
min{I−i,m−o}∑
q=max{0,I+O−i−M}
min{ω,i}∑
α=max{0,ω+i−I}
min{Ω−ω,o+O−i}∑
ϕ=max{0,Ω+O+I+o−ω−i−m−M}
min{I,o+O}∑
i′=max{0,I+o+O−m−M}
min{i′,o}∑
l′=max{0,i′−O}
min{I−i′,m−o}∑
q′=max{0,I+O−i′−M}
min{ω,i′}∑
α′=max{0,ω+i′−I}
min{Ω−ω,o+O−i′}∑
ϕ′=max{0,Ω+O+I+o−ω−i′−m−M}
ω (I − ω) (η′det)2 (1− η′det)m+M−2
G(m, o,M,O, I,Ω, i, ω, l, q, α, ϕ, i′, l′, q′, α′, ϕ′), (B31)
and
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pZnc =
∞∑
n=1
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=1
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qM
n∑
k=1
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
o+k−x∑
s=1
m−o+n−k−y∑
t=1
min{o,s}∑
u=max{0,s+x−k}
min{m−o,t}∑
v=max{0,t+k+y−n}
min{o,s}∑
u′=max{0,s+x−k}
min{m−o,t}∑
v′=max{0,t+k+y−n}
N∑
K=1
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
O+K−X∑
S=1
M−O+N−K−Y∑
T=1
min{O,S}∑
U=max{0,S+X−K}
min{M−O,T}∑
V=max{0,T+K+Y−N}
min{O,S}∑
U ′=max{0,S+X−K}
min{M−O,T}∑
V ′=max{0,T+K+Y−N}
Λc Λd
m+M∑
I=1
m+M∑
Ω=1
min{I,o+O}∑
i=max{0,I+o+O−m−M}
min{Ω,I}∑
ω=max{1,1+Ω+I−m−M}
min{i,o}∑
l=max{0,i−O}
min{I−i,m−o}∑
q=max{0,I+O−i−M}
min{ω,i}∑
α=max{0,ω+i−I}
min{Ω−ω,o+O−i}∑
ϕ=max{0,Ω+O+I+o−ω−i−m−M}
min{I,o+O}∑
i′=max{0,I+o+O−m−M}
min{i′,o}∑
l′=max{0,i′−O}
min{I−i′,m−o}∑
q′=max{0,I+O−i′−M}
min{ω,i′}∑
α′=max{0,ω+i′−I}
min{Ω−ω,o+O−i′}∑
ϕ′=max{0,Ω+O+I+o−ω−i′−m−M}
ω (m+M + ω − I − Ω) (η′det)2 (1− η′det)m+M−2
G(m, o,M,O, I,Ω, i, ω, l, q, α, ϕ, i′, l′, q′, α′, ϕ′). (B32)
Note, that the only differences between pZc and
pZnc are in the limits of the index ω and in the
expression after the sums. Moreover, the term
G(m, o,M,O, I,Ω, i, ω, l, q, α, ϕ, i′, l′, q′, α′, ϕ′) is given
by the following expression
G(m, o,M,O, I,Ω, i, ω, l, q, α, ϕ, i′, l′, q′, α′, ϕ′) =
ω!(I − ω)!(Ω− ω)!(m+M + ω − I − Ω)! (−1)ϕ+α+ϕ′+α′−l−q−l′−q′
o! (m− o)!O! (M −O)! 4m+M(
o
l
)(
O
i− l
)(
m− o
q
)(
M −O
I − i− q
)(
i
α
)(
I − i
ω − α
)(
o+O − i
ϕ
)(
m+M + i− o−O − I
Ω− ω − ϕ
)(
o
l′
)(
O
i′ − l′
)(
m− o
q′
)
(
M −O
I − i′ − q′
)(
i′
α′
)(
I − i′
ω − α′
)(
o+O − i′
ϕ′
)(
m+M + i′ − o−O − I
Ω− ω − ϕ′
)
. (B33)
4. Derivation of pXc and p
X
nc
The derivation of the probabilities pXc and p
X
nc is very
similar to the derivation of pZc and p
Z
nc in Appendix B 3.
However, for the X-basis we perform the derivation with
a slightly different structure, that is, we perform the X
measurements at the very end, after Charlie’s QND mea-
surement and BSM have gone through successfully. How-
ever, we remark that the calculations could also be done
using the same structure like in Appendix B 3.
So firstly, we obtain the state that Alice (Bob) has af-
ter Charlie’s QND measurement was performed success-
fully on her (his) side, which is described by the following
POVM:
Π = Πgh1 ⊗Πgv1 ⊗Πhh0 ⊗Πhv0 , (B34)
where note that we use the same notation for the modes
as in Fig. 7 and we excluded the X measurement so far.
Let us denote this state by σAC (σBC) on Alice’s (Bob’s)
side. Then, we take the tensor product σAC ⊗ σBC and
perform the middle BSM with the POVM of Eq. (B34),
but here the modes correspond to Fig. 8 since this is
the measurement being executed. Next, on the obtained
state from the BSM, the parties perform the X measure-
ment, which essentially means that they apply Hadamard
gates on their modes and after that they perform the Z
measurement in Fig. 7. Let σ′ab denote the state held
by Alice and Bob after they apply the Hadamard gates,
where a (b) represents the optical mode entering the PNR
detectors in the Z measurement at Alice’s (Bob’s) site.
Considering the detection patterns that define the cor-
related (correct) and anti-correlated (non-correct) raw
key generation events, as explained previously in Ap-
pendix B 1, we have that
pXc = Trab
(
ΠXc σ
′
ab
)
, (B35)
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pXnc = Trab
(
ΠXnc σ
′
ab
)
, (B36)
with
ΠXc = Π
ah
1 ⊗Πav0 ⊗Πbh0 ⊗Πbv1 , (B37)
and
ΠXnc = Π
ah
1 ⊗Πav0 ⊗Πbh1 ⊗Πbv0 . (B38)
Here, for simplicity we only present the results for the
main steps of the derivation. The state σAC is given by
the following formula:
σAC =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
pn qm
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
min{n−y,o+k}∑
k′=max{x,o+k−m}
ΛQND(n,m, k, x, y, o, k
′) |k, n− k, o,m− o〉a′c
〈k′, n− k′, o+ k − k′,m− o− k + k′|a′c, (B39)
where a′ (c) is the mode that enters Alice’s X
measurement (Charlie’s BSM from Alice’s side) and
ΛQND(n,m, k, x, y, o, k
′) is given by the following expres-
sion:
ΛQND(n,m, k, x, y, o, k
′) =
η2det (1− ηdet)n+m−x−y−2 ηn−x−ych (1− ηch)x+y
√
k! (n− k)!(k′)! (n− k′)! o! (m− o)!
(n+ 1) (m+ 1)x! y! 2n+m−x−y√
(o+ k − k′)!(m− o− k + k′)!
o∑
u=0
m−o∑
v=0
k−x∑
w=max{0,1−u}
n−k−y∑
z=max{0,1−v}
min{u+w,o+k−k′}∑
u′=max{0,u+w+x−k′}
min{v+z,m−o−k+k′}∑
v′=max{0,v+z+y+k′−n}
(−1)u′+v′−u−v(u+ w)(v + z)(u+ w)!(v + z)!(o− u+ k − x− w)!(n− k − y − z +m− o− v)!
u! v!w! z! (u′)! (v′)!(k − x− w)!(n− k − y − z)!(o− u)!(m− o− v)!(u+ w − u′)!(k′ − x− u− w + u′)!(v + z − v′)!
1
(n− k′ − y − v − z + v′)! (o+ k − k′ − u′)! (m− o− k + k′ − v′)! . (B40)
We note that σBC has the exact same form with mode b
′
(d) entering Bob’s X measurement (Charlie’s BSM from
Bob’s side) and in the expression of σBC we use capital
letter indices similarly to Appendix B 3:
σBC =
∞∑
N=0
∞∑
M=0
pN qM
N∑
K=0
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
min{N−Y,O+K}∑
K′=max{X,O+K−M}
ΛQND(N,M,K,X, Y,O,K
′)
|K,N −K,O,M −O〉b′d
〈K ′, N −K ′, O +K −K ′,M −O −K +K ′|b′d. (B41)
Then we obtain σ′ab by performing Charlie’s BSM on
modes c and d and applying Hadamard gates to the
modes a′ and b′:
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σ′ab =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=0
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qM
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
min{n−y,o+k}∑
k′=max{x,o+k−m}
N∑
K=0
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
min{N−Y,O+K}∑
K′=max{X,O+K−M}
o∑
l=0
m−o∑
q=0
O∑
L=0
M−O∑
Q=0
o+k−k′∑
l′=0
m−o−k+k′∑
q′=0
min{O+K−K′,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′}∑
L′=max{0,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′−M+O+K−K′}
l′+L′∑
α′=0
q+Q+l+L−l′−L′−max{0,1+α′−l′−L′}∑
β′=max{0,1−α′}
min{l+L,α′+β′}∑
α=max{0,α′+β′−q−Q}
o−l+O−L∑
ϕ=0
m−o−q+M−O−Q∑
ε=0
min{ϕ+ε,o+k−k′−l′+O+K−K′−L′}∑
ϕ′=max{0,ϕ+ε−m+o+k−k′−M+O+K−K′+q+Q+l+L−l′−L′}
GX
k∑
τ=0
n−k∑
ν=0
K∑
χ=0
N−K∑
ω=0
k′∑
τ ′=0
n−k′∑
ν′=0
K′∑
χ′=0
N−K′∑
ω′=0
fH(n,N, k,K, τ, ν, χ, ω)fH(n,N, k
′,K ′, τ ′, ν′, χ′, ω′)
g(n,N, τ + ν, ω + χ, τ ′ + ν′, ω′ + χ′)
|τ + ν, n− τ − ν, ω + χ,N − ω − χ〉ab〈τ ′ + ν′, n− τ ′ − ν′, ω′ + χ′, N − ω′ − χ′|, (B42)
where, for the sake of convenience, we introduced the following functions:
GX ≡ GX(n,m,N,M, k, x, y, o, k′,K,X, Y,O,K ′, l, q, L,Q, l′, q′, L′, α′, β′, α, ϕ, ε, ϕ′) = ΛQND(n,m, k, x, y, o, k′)
ΛQND(N,M,K,X, Y,O,K
′) (α′ + β′)!(ϕ+ ε)!(l + L+ q +Q− α′ − β′)! (−1)
L−L′−q′−q+α−α′−ϕ′−ϕ
2m+M
(m+M − l − L− q −Q− ϕ− ε)! fH(m,M, o+ k − k′, O +K −K ′, l′, q′, L′, q +Q+ l + L− q′ − l′ − L′)
fH(m,M, o,O, l, q, L,Q)
(
l + L
α
)(
q +Q
α′ + β′ − α
)(
o− l +O − L
ϕ
)(
m− o− q +M −O −Q
ε
)(
l′ + L′
α′
)
(
q +Q+ l + L− l′ − L′
β′
)(
m− o− k + k′ +M −O −K +K ′ − q −Q− l − L+ l′ + L′
ϕ+ ε− ϕ′
)
(
o+ k − k′ − l′ +O +K −K ′ − L′
ϕ′
)
g(m,M, o,O, o+ k − k′, O +K −K ′) g(n,N, k,K, k′,K ′)
d(m,M,α′ + β′, q +Q+ l + L− α′ − β′, η′det), (B43)
and
g(n,N, k,K, k′,K ′) =
1√
k!(n− k)!K!(N −K)!
1√
(k′)!(n− k′)!(K ′)!(N −K ′)! , (B44)
which enters into the expressions when the Fock-states
are expressed with the creation/annihilation operators,
and
fH(n,N, k,K, τ, ν, χ, ω) =
(−1)−k−K−ν−ω
√
2
n+N
(
k
τ
)(
n− k
ν
)
(
K
χ
)(
N −K
ω
)
, (B45)
which is introduced due to the Hadamard gates included
in the implementation, and
d(m,M, x, y, η) = x y η2(1− η)m+M−2, (B46)
which comes from the successful detection pattern’s
POVM. With the formula for σ′ab, given by Eq. (B42),
and Eqs. (B35)-(B36) we can obtain
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pXc =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=0
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qM
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
min{n−y,o+k}∑
k′=max{x,o+k−m}
N∑
K=0
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
min{N−Y,O+K}∑
K′=max{X,O+K−M}
o∑
l=0
m−o∑
q=0
O∑
L=0
M−O∑
Q=0
o+k−k′∑
l′=0
m−o−k+k′∑
q′=0
min{O+K−K′,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′}∑
L′=max{0,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′−M+O+K−K′}
l′+L′∑
α′=0
q+Q+l+L−l′−L′−max{0,1+α′−l′−L′}∑
β′=max{0,1−α′}
min{l+L,α′+β′}∑
α=max{0,α′+β′−q−Q}
o−l+O−L∑
ϕ=0
m−o−q+M−O−Q∑
ε=0
min{ϕ+ε,o+k−k′−l′+O+K−K′−L′}∑
ϕ′=max{0,ϕ+ε−m+o+k−k′−M+O+K−K′+q+Q+l+L−l′−L′}
GX
k∑
τ=0
n−k∑
ν=max{0,1−τ}
K∑
χ=0
N−max{K,1+χ}∑
ω=0
min{k′,τ+ν}∑
τ ′=max{0,τ+ν−n+k′}
min{K′,ω+χ}∑
χ′=max{0,ω+χ−N+K′}
fH(n,N, k,K, τ, ν, χ, ω)
g(n,N, τ + ν, ω + χ, τ + ν, ω + χ)
fH(n,N, k
′,K ′, τ ′, τ + ν − τ ′, χ′, ω + χ− χ′) d(n,N, τ + ν,N − ω − χ, ηdet), (B47)
and
pXnc =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
N=0
∞∑
M=0
pn qm pN qM
n∑
k=0
k∑
x=0
n−k∑
y=0
m∑
o=0
min{n−y,o+k}∑
k′=max{x,o+k−m}
N∑
K=0
K∑
X=0
N−K∑
Y=0
M∑
O=0
min{N−Y,O+K}∑
K′=max{X,O+K−M}
o∑
l=0
m−o∑
q=0
O∑
L=0
M−O∑
Q=0
o+k−k′∑
l′=0
m−o−k+k′∑
q′=0
min{O+K−K′,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′}∑
L′=max{0,q+Q+l+L−q′−l′−M+O+K−K′}
l′+L′∑
α′=0
q+Q+l+L−l′−L′−max{0,1+α′−l′−L′}∑
β′=max{0,1−α′}
min{l+L,α′+β′}∑
α=max{0,α′+β′−q−Q}
o−l+O−L∑
ϕ=0
m−o−q+M−O−Q∑
ε=0
min{ϕ+ε,o+k−k′−l′+O+K−K′−L′}∑
ϕ′=max{0,ϕ+ε−m+o+k−k′−M+O+K−K′+q+Q+l+L−l′−L′}
GX
k∑
τ=0
n−k∑
ν=max{0,1−τ}
K∑
χ=0
N−K∑
ω=max{0,1−χ}
min{k′,τ+ν}∑
τ ′=max{0,τ+ν−n+k′}
min{K′,ω+χ}∑
χ′=max{0,ω+χ−N+K′}
fH(n,N, k,K, τ, ν, χ, ω)
g(n,N, τ + ν, ω + χ, τ + ν, ω + χ)
fH(n,N, k
′,K ′, τ ′, τ + ν − τ ′, χ′, ω + χ− χ′) d(n,N, τ + ν, ω + χ, ηdet). (B48)
Note that the differences between pXc and p
X
nc are in the
limits of the summation index ω and in the arguments
of the function d. Moreover, we note that we have found
strong numerical evidence that pXc = p
Z
c and p
X
nc = p
Z
nc
hold, but we have not been able to show it analytically
by comparing Eq. (B31) and Eq. (B32) to Eq. (B47) and
Eq. (B48).
Now, with Eq. (B18), Eq. (B31), Eq. (B32), Eq. (B47)
and Eq. (B48) we have all the quantities that are required
in order to evaluate the secret key rate of the protocol,
which is given by Eq. (B5).
5. Derivation of the secret key rate in the case of
ηdet = 1 and τ = 0
The unit efficiency secret key rate formula can be ob-
tained by noting that in the quantities pQND, p
Z
c , p
Z
nc,
pXc and p
X
nc, given by Eq. (B18), Eq. (B31), Eq. (B32),
Eq. (B47) and Eq. (B48) only those terms in which the
power of (1 − ηdet) and (1 − η′det) is 0 contribute to the
sums. This gives restriction on the indices appearing in
the power of the terms (1− ηdet) and (1− η′det). System-
atically examining the different cases one by one, we can
rule out most of possibilities for the indices. For this, we
need to keep in mind that if a sum happens to have a
smaller number in the upper limit than that in the lower
limit, then the corresponding term gives no contribution
to the sum.
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Using the recipe given above and the formulas
Eq. (B18), Eq. (B31), Eq. (B32), Eq. (B47) and
Eq. (B48), we have that
p
[ηdet=1, τ=0]
QND =
p1 (2 q2 (1− ηch) + 3 q1 ηch)
48
, (B49)
pZ[ηdet=1, τ=0]c = p
X[ηdet=1, τ=0]
c =
p21 q
2
1 η
2
ch
1024
, (B50)
and
pZ[ηdet=1, τ=0]nc = p
X[ηdet=1, τ=0]
nc = 0. (B51)
It is interesting that pZnc turns out to be 0 when we set
ηdet = 1 and τ = 0 s. In the case considered in the calcu-
lations above, Alice and Bob both measured H (horizon-
tal) polarizations in their Z measurement and the two
QND measurements succeeded on both side. This means
that Charlie’s BSM will get input signals in V (vertical)
polarizations from both sides. An error can only occur
when they apply the bit flip (see step 5 of the proto-
col), which only happens when Charlie detects a singlet
state. But due to the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect the pho-
tons will always go to the same arm, therefore in this
ideal case Charlie cannot obtain a singlet detection. The
same argument holds for the X-basis as well. Plugging
Eq. (B49), Eq. (B50) and Eq. (B51) into Eq. (B5) we
obtain the secret key rate formula for the unit detection
efficiency case, given by Eq. (8).
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